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ABSTRACT  
Since around 1980, Ranulph Glanville has put forward the idea that rather than seeing 
research in design as one form of science, we instead see scientific research as a 
specific form of design. This argument, based on the way that scientific research 
inevitably involves design activity but not vice versa, and others like it around that 
time consolidate a shift during the 1970s in thinking about design, from a concern 
with the scientific method to the idea that design has its own epistemological 
foundations as a discipline. The attempt to base design on a linear version of the 
scientific method failed for reasons that have been pointed out by Horst Rittel 
amongst others: because design involves the creation of the new, design questions 
cannot be exhaustively formulated in advance. This has marked something of a 
parting of the ways between design and science as being incompatible in terms of 
method. 
Given Glanville’s argument this is not what we might expect: if science is a limited 
form of design, shouldn’t scientific approaches be commensurable with design even if 
they are not a basis for it? This apparent disjunction is only the case if we follow the 
changes in how design was thought about during this period without also following 
the comparable changes regarding science. Both broadly parallel each other, moving 
from a concern with method in the 1960s through a critique of this in the 1970s to 
new foundations from the 1980s onwards, focusing on what designers and scientists 
actually do in practice. Indeed the key critiques of method advanced by Feyerabend 
and Rittel, in science and design respectively, have similar structures and, so, what 
seems at first sight to be a rupture can also be read as a parallel journey. 
Using this account as a basis, and in the light of recent discussions regarding the idea 
of second order science, I suggest that we can understand contemporary design 
research as one example of second order research practice, as is indicated by its 
continuity with cybernetics. More speculatively, and with reference to the Fun Palace 
project of Joan Littlewood and Cedric Price, to which Gordon Pask also contributed, I 
suggest that architecture can itself sometimes be thought of as facilitating such a 
reflective and participatory enquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between architecture and science has come in and out of focus over 
recent decades and, indeed, over recent centuries. In this working paper I review some 
aspects of this relationship that are pertinent in the light of current discussions 
regarding second-order science. I go on to suggest that we understand contemporary 
practice based design research as one example of second-order research practice, as is 
indicated by its continuity with cybernetics. More speculatively, and with reference to 
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the Fun Palace project of avant-garde theatre producer Joan Littlewood and architect 
Cedric Price, to which cybernetician Gordon Pask also contributed, I suggest that 
architecture can itself sometimes be thought of as facilitating such a reflective and 
participatory enquiry. 
METHOD AND PRACTICE IN DESIGN AND SCIENCE 
During the period of scientific and technological optimism that followed the Second 
World War, there was a tendency to see design as something that should be put on 
rational scientific foundations. This is most clearly evident in the design methods 
movement, which attempted to systemise design as a logical process modeled on the 
scientific method, but also as a longstanding concern in architecture in its relationship 
to technology and rationalism. Since around 1980 this view has been countered by 
arguments that have seen design as a discipline in its own right and so as being of the 
same status as science rather than something to be corrected by it. Amongst these, the 
account developed by Ranulph Glanville (1981, 1999) is particularly strongly framed, 
reversing what had been the more usual hierarchy. Rather than seeing design research 
as one specific form of scientific research, Glanville argues that, instead, we can see 
science as a specific form of design enquiry. This follows from the way that scientific 
research inevitably involves design activity, for instance in devising and setting up 
experiments, but not vice versa. Design is therefore the more general case and so, 
Glanville argues, if there is to be any hierarchy between the two then design should be 
given priority. This argument and others like it around that time, such as those of 
Bruce Archer (1979), Nigel Cross (1982) and Donald Schön (1983/1991), consolidate 
a shift during the 1970s from trying to base design on the scientific method to the idea 
that it has its own epistemological foundations, independent of science. 
The attempt to order design according to a linear version of the scientific method, 
understood as moving from analysing the problem at hand to testing and optimising 
solutions to it, failed for reasons that seem obvious in retrospect: because design 
involves the creation of new situations, design questions cannot be fully formulated in 
advance but shift and change as they are explored and as proposals are enacted. One 
of the most important accounts of these limitations is that developed by design 
theorist Horst Rittel, who, writing with the urban designer Melvin Webber, 
characterised the situations which designers (more specifically planners, but the point 
is generally applicable) encounter as “wicked problems”, the complex 
interdependencies of which make them unsolvable using conventional linear problem 
solving (Rittel & Webber, 1973).  
On the face of it, Rittel and Webber’s observations mark an incompatibility between 
design and science in terms of method. Indeed the exhaustion of design methods, with 
leading figures such as Christopher Alexander, J Christopher Jones and, indeed, Rittel 
distancing themselves from it during the 1970s (as noted by Cross, 2007, p. 42), was 
one part of the unraveling of modernism more generally and marks something of a 
parting of the ways between design and science. However, given Glanville’s 
argument noted above, this is not what we might expect: if science is a limited form 
of design, shouldn’t scientific approaches be commensurable with design even if not a 
basis for it? This disjunction is only the case if we follow the changes in how design 
was thought about during this period without also following the comparable changes 
regarding science. Indeed, as Glanville (1999, p. 80) notes, the version of science that 
was applied in design methods was distant from that which was practiced in scientific 
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research itself. Design research and the philosophy of science broadly parallel each 
other over this period. Both move from a concern with method in the 1960s through a 
critique of this in the 1970s to new foundations from the 1980s onwards, focusing on 
what designers and scientists actually do in practice rather than on what seems ideal in 
theory. As noted above, this saw design being seen as a discipline in its own right, 
with its own “designerly ways of knowing” (Cross, 1982). In the context of science 
there was a comparable turn towards the social and material agency of research 
practice, such as in the work of Andrew Pickering (1995) amongst others. 
In this light, what appears to be a rupture between design and science during the 
1970s is instead a close parallel. Indeed the key critiques advanced in each area—that 
of Rittel in design and that of Paul Feyerabend (1970, 1978/1982, 1975/1993) in 
science, who were colleagues at UC Berkeley while they were developing their 
ideas—have similar content. Science, like design, involves creating new ideas and 
understanding. The criteria and methods appropriate to these cannot therefore be 
defined in advance if science is to progress but will change as part of the process. 
Feyerabend’s reductio ad absurdum argument against predefined methods concludes 
by showing that the only criteria that can be given in advance that will not inhibit 
scientific progress is that “anything goes”, a phrase which also appears in Rittel and 
Webber (1973, p. 164), while Rittel (1972, p. 393) has “everything goes”. 
Furthermore, Feyerabend’s (1978/1982) comments that the proponents of scientific 
theory are out of touch with scientific practice echoes the situation in design where 
Design Methods had become an “academic game” divorced from practice (Jones, 
1974/1984, p. 26), as well as with Glanville’s (1999, p. 80) comments regarding the 
form of science applied to design, as noted above. 
THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN DESIGN RESEARCH AND CYBERNETICS 
As well as these parallels, contemporary accounts of science as a form of forward 
looking search, such as those put forward by Pickering (1995, 2010) and which are 
anticipated by cybernetics, can also be read as applying to how designers work. 
Cybernetics, which Pickering (2010) explores in depth, has had longstanding 
connections to design, with, in particular, Ross Ashby lecturing at the Ulm School of 
Design (with Rittel) and being an influence on Christopher Alexander and Pask 
collaborating with architects Cedric Price and Nicholas Negroponte as well as 
teaching at the Architectural Association in London and writing on architecture (Pask, 
1969).  
More recently, Glanville (2007) has argued, drawing on Pask’s (1976) Conversation 
Theory and the common characterisation of design as a conversation (such as by 
Schön, 1983/1991), that cybernetics and design are analogous to each other. This 
parallel is substantial, resting on the shared centrality in each of both circular, 
conversational processes and also the observer (designer) as an active participant, to 
the extent that Glanville (2007, p. 1178) argues that “cybernetics is the theory of 
design and design is the action of cybernetics”. This analogy is reinforced by 
Pickering’s (2010) analysis which has emphasised the performative nature of the 
work of Pask and others, who played out their ideas using physical, experimental 
devices in much the same way that designers explore ideas through modeling and 
drawing. Therefore, while design research continues to make reference to cybernetic 
ideas, we can also understand it as a contemporary variety of cybernetic research, 
whether the connections with cybernetics are made explicitly or not. 
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Given this continuity, it makes sense to consider design research in relation to recent 
discussions of second order science, which have drawn on cybernetics (Müller & 
Riegler, 2011). Practice based design research, an expanding and still somewhat 
contested research field, is built on the two “motivations” for second order science 
that Karl Müller and Alexander Riegler (2011, pp. 2-3) note: the inclusion of the 
observer, in the sense of reflective and collaborative practice, and that of self-
reflexivity, where design is used to operate on and explore itself (similarly to the 
cybernetics of cybernetics). This connection is an important point of comparison for 
how second order science can be constituted as a research field, providing a possible 
example that is practice based and outward looking while also recalling the 
performative explorations of earlier cybernetics. For the field of design, this is 
suggestive of a relationship between design and science that is based in a mutual 
enquiry rather than in the application of one field to, or in service of, the other. 
ARCHITECTURE AS FACILITATING SECOND ORDER ENQUIRY 
More speculatively, architecture can itself be thought of as, at least sometimes, 
facilitating a similar sort of enquiry in our experience of it as that in which designers 
and cyberneticians engage. In a weak sense this is quite common. Architecture makes 
our relationship with the world experienceable and so questionable. This is partly 
latent in the slow evolution of everyday situations in relation to natural conditions, as 
described for instance by Dalibor Vesely (2004), or in the different ways that a 
building mediates between us and our environment. There is also, more explicitly, a 
tradition within architecture where buildings have been used to situate us in 
relationship to a particular understanding of the world. While this has often tended 
towards being didactic, and so towards minimising the potential for reinterpretation, 
the spatialisation of ideas nevertheless allows them to become something we 
participate in and interact with, similar to the physical devices of Pask and others. For 
instance, the intensely moving experience of visiting a building such as the Pantheon 
in Rome can be thought of in terms of the two motivations of second order science 
noted above: firstly, what is special about it is inseparable from our experience of it 
(hence the inclusion of the observer); secondly, it is both a model of an aspect of the 
world and a contribution to that world (and so contains itself, self-reflexively). 
There are also examples of architecture that, in a stronger sense, can be understood as 
cybernetic enquiries. The most significant of these is that of the unrealised Fun Palace 
project of Cedric Price and Joan Littlewood, developed during the 1960s and to which 
Pask also contributed. The Fun Palace was conceived as a “university of the streets” 
(Littlewood, 1964, p. 322) that blurred the boundaries between leisure and education 
and, within it, the sciences and the arts. The proposed architecture could be 
reconfigured, using an overhead gantry crane, in response to the requests and 
activities of its visitors, providing facilities for a multitude of programs, including 
ones that would emerge through the interactions it housed and which could therefore, 
in principle, not be predicated in advance.  
Recent scholarship on the Fun Palace has explored its cybernetic aspects and Pask’s 
role (Lobsinger, 2000; Mathews, 2005, 2006, 2007). This has tended to characterise 
cybernetics as a field of technical expertise that was applied to the project. In contrast 
to this, I propose understanding the Fun Palace in similar terms to Pask’s various 
performative devices, such as Musicolour or the Colloquy of Mobiles, and so within 
the context of cybernetic exploration and research. 
Architecture and Second Order Science 
5 
While the Fun Palace has been thought of as a reprogrammable “virtual architecture” 
(Mathews, 2006), it can also be thought of as a non-trivial machine in that its past use 
would change its future operation as it, its users and its organisers all learnt, and so 
changed, as in Pask’s account of conversation. Thus while the organisation of the Fun 
Palace was highly purposeful, there would be no fixed direction to conform to, other 
than the maintenance of a degree of variety conducive to continuing novelty. In this 
way the Fun Palace, if built, would have enabled a form of forward looking search, 
similar to Pickering’s characterisation of cybernetics and science more generally, 
questioning received ideas regarding leisure, education and society and developing, 
not just applying, new ones. It is distinguishable in this regard from comparable 
projects of its era, such as Constant Nieuwenhuys’s New Babylon and Renzo Piano 
and Richard Rogers’ Centre Pompidou, in that it aimed not to just respond to or 
accommodate the needs and wishes of its users or curators but to engage them in 
mutual enquiry. In this way the Fun Palace, and also Price’s later Generator project 
(1976 onwards) to which John and Julia Frazer brought the boredom idea from Pask’s 
Musicolour installation (Furtado Cardoso Lopes, 2008), put forward an idea of 
architecture as operating as a second order enquiry both in terms of its participative 
engagement with its users and its self-reflexive enquiry as to its own purpose. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The ideas developed in this working paper are influenced by some of the discussions 
that have formed part of an ongoing collaborative research project at the Canadian 
Centre for Architecture (CCA), funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, 
exploring the unravelling of the post war consensus in British architecture and culture. 
I am grateful to my fellow researchers (Nick Beech, Tim Ivison, Simon Sadler and 
Murray Fraser), the CCA and the Mellon Foundation for their support. More 
information on the project can be found at http://www.cca.qc.ca/en/study-
centre/2307-19451975-british-culture-for-architecture 
REFERENCES 
Archer, B. (1979). Design as a discipline, Design Studies. 1(1): 17-20. doi: 
10.1016/0142-694X(79)90023-1 
Cross, N. (1982). Designerly ways of knowing, Design Studies. 3(4): 221-227. doi: 
10.1016/0142-694X(82)90040-0 
Cross, N. (2007). From a design science to a design discipline: Understanding 
designerly ways of knowing and thinking, in Design research now: Essays and 
selected projects, (R. Michel, ed.), Birkhäuser, Basel. 
Feyerabend, P. K. (1970). Against method, in Analyses of theories and methods of 
physics and psychology, Vol. IV, (M. Radner & S. Winokur, eds.), pp. 17-130, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Retrieved from 
http://www.mcps.umn.edu/philosophy/completeVol4.html 
Feyerabend, P. K. (1982). Science in a free society. Verso, London. (Original work 
published: 1978). 
Feyerabend, P. K. (1993). Against method (3rd ed.). Verso, London. (Original work 
published: 1975). 
Furtado Cardoso Lopes, G. M. (2008). Cedric Price's Generator and the Frazers' 
systems research, Technoetic Arts. 6(1): 55-72. doi: 10.1386/tear.6.1.55_1 
Architecture and Second Order Science 
6 
Glanville, R. (1981). Why design research?, in Design, science, method: Proceedings 
of the 1980 Design Research Society conference, (R. Jacues & J. Powell, eds.), 
pp. 86-94, Westbury House, Guildford. 
Glanville, R. (1999). Researching design and designing research, Design Issues. 
15(2): 80-91. doi: 10.2307/1511844 
Glanville, R. (2007). Try again. Fail again. Fail better: The cybernetics in design and 
the design in cybernetics, Kybernetes. 36(9/10): 1173-1206. doi: 
10.1108/03684920710827238 
Jones, J. C. (1984). How my thoughts about design methods have changed during the 
years, in Essays in design), pp. 13-27, WIley, Chichester. (Reprinted from: J 
Christopher Jones, Dear architects, College of Architecture, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1974). 
Littlewood, J. (1964). A laboratory of fun, New Scientist. 22(391): 432-433. 
Lobsinger, M. L. (2000). Cybernetic theory and the architecture of performance: 
Cedric Price's Fun Palace, in Anxious modernisms: Experimentatiion in post-
war architectural culture, (S. W. Goldhagen & R. Legault, eds.), pp. 119-139, 
MIT Press, Cambirdge, MA. 
Mathews, S. (2005). The Fun Palace: Cedric Price’s experiment in architecture and 
technology, Technoetic Arts: A Journal of Speculative Research. 3(2): 73-91. 
doi: 10.1386/tear.3.2.73/1  
Mathews, S. (2006). The Fun Palace as virtual architecture: Cedric Price and the 
practices of indeterminacy, Journal of Architectural Education. 59(3): 39-48. 
Mathews, S. (2007). From agit-prop to free space: The architecture of Cedric Price. 
Black Dog, London. 
Müller, K. H., & Riegler, A., (eds.) (2011). Second-order science. Special issue of 
Construcivist Foundations. 10(1). 
Pask, G. (1969). The architectural relevance of cybernetics, Architectural Design. 
39(9): 494-496. 
Pask, G. (1976). Conversation theory: Applications in education and epistemology. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam. Retrieved from 
http://pangaro.com/pask/ConversationTheory.zip 
Pickering, A. (1995). The mangle of practice: Time, agency, and science. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Pickering, A. (2010). The cybernetic brain: Sketches of another future. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Rittel, H. (1972). On the planning crisis: Systems analysis of the "first and second 
generations", Bedriftskonomen. 8: 390-396. 
Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, Policy 
Sciences. 4: 155-169. 
Schön, D. A. (1991). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. 
Arena, Farnham. (Original work published: 1983). 
Vesely, D. (2004). Architecture in the age of divided representation: The question of 
creativity in the shadow of production. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
